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ARGUMENT 
Johnson opposes Nunez' appeal by taking issue with two factual matters, argues 
that the court has discretion to deny a motion to set aside a void judgment, and argues 
that strict compliance with rule ll(b)(3) is not necessary. Nunez addresses these three 
issues below. 
I. Factual Matters. 
There are two factual matters that are disputed. 
First, Johnson correctly points out that Nunez picked up her file from her prior 
attorney but fails to inform the court that Nunez picked up her file after Johnson filed a 
motion to dismiss, which was many months after Nunez' counsel was supposed to serve 
the order of withdrawal on Nunez. Prior to receiving the motion to dismiss, Nunez' 
withdrawing counsel had called Nunez to ask her to come in to pick up her file but it was 
not until after Nunez received the copy of the motion to dismiss that she went to her 
former attorney's office to retrieve her file. Nunez immediately hired new counsel upon 
receipt of the motion to dismiss but the trial court granted the motion to dismiss just four 
days after the motion was filed and before Nunez' new counsel could file an opposition 
to the motion. See R. 16. 
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In addition, Johnson argues that the court served a copy of the order granting 
withdrawal on Nunez but that is not true. The record shows that the order was delivered 
to an individual at zip code 83402, see R. 25, but Nunez lives at an address with a zip 
code 83401. See Aug. R. 13. The District Court is located in zip code area 83402. The 
USPS tracking document clearly shows that the letter was unclaimed and that the 
maximum hold time had expired. See R. 25. The delivery of the unclaimed letter was 
made to an individual at an address in the 8340J zip code area, not to Nunez who lives in 
the 83401 zip code area. Whoever received it was at an address that was not Nunez' and 
since the court clerk sent the letter and the court's address is in 83402 it is safe to assume 
the letter was sent back to the clerk. 
II. The standard under rule 60(b)(4) is not discretionary. 
Johnson argues that this Court has not addressed whether to apply a 
nondiscretionary standard when a party moves to set aside a judgment under rule 60(b )( 4) 
because the judgment is void. See Jim and Maryann Plane Family Trust v. Skinner, 342 
P.3d 639, 643 n. 2 (Idaho 2015). 
While the statement in Skinner may be true regarding the general application of 
rule 60(b )( 4 ), it is not true when specifically addressing judgments that are void for 
failure to comply with rule 11.3. This Court has already adopted the Court of Appeals' 
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nondiscretionary standard under rule 60(b )( 4) when applied to judgments that are void for 
failure to comply with rule 11.3. See Wright v. Wright, 950 P .2d 1257 (Idaho 1998). 
In Wright, this Court noted that the Idaho Court of Appeals has required strict 
compliance with rule 11.3 before sustaining a default judgment obtained after a party's 
attorney has withdrawn and, if not, "the judgment must be set aside as a matter of law, 
rather than a matter of discretion. This Court agrees that there must be strict 
compliance with rule ll(b)(3)." Id. (citations omitted). 
Johnson fails to cite to Wright or provide any discussion about the holding in 
Wright that this Court agreed with the Idaho Court of Appeals that there must be strict 
compliance with rule 11.3 when deciding whether a district must set aside a judgment as 
a matter oflaw. 
But even if the issue is unresolved as to judgments that are void for failure to 
comply with rule 11.3, this Court should follow federal interpretations of rule 60(b )( 4) 
that hold that the standard is nondiscretionary. 
This Court held that it adopted federal rules "with the interpretation placed upon 
that language by the federal courts." Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 723 P.2d 814, 819 (Idaho 
1986). This Court explained, 
The reason for adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Idaho, and 
interpreting our own rules adopted from the federal courts as uniformly as 
possible with the federal cases, was to establish a uniform practice and 
procedure in both the federal and state courts in the State of Idaho. 
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Id. 
This Court noted that the Idaho Court of Appeals ' holding that the decision to set 
aside a void judgment under rule 60(b )( 4) is "grounded in the federal courts' 
interpretation of F.R.C.P. 60(b)(4)" and is supported by the policy that a court should not 
enforce a void judgment. See Skinner, n. 2 ( quoting Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 991 P .2d 
369, 372 n.2 (Idaho App. 1998)). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court had a 
nondiscretionary duty to grant relief from a default judgment under rule 60(b )( 4) when a 
judgment was void. See Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional De Produccion De 
Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1256 (9th Cir. 1980). 
"Either a judgment is void or it is valid .... [W]hen that question is resolved, the 
court must act accordingly." Id. (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2862, at 197). 
In sum, this Court has already adopted a position that rule 11.3 must be strictly 
complied with before sustaining a default judgment following the withdrawal of a party's 
attorney but if there is any question of this Court's holding in Wright, this Court should 
follow the federal interpretations to rule 60(b )( 4) that adopt a nondiscretionary standard. 
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III. RULE 11.3 MUST BE STRICTLY FOLLOWED 
Johnson argues that rule 11.3 does not need to be strictly followed and instead 
argues that this Court should evaluate whether the failure to comply was harmless error. 
See Respondent's Brief 11. 
Johnson's position is contradicted by this Court's holding in Wright. In Wright, 
this Court noted that the Idaho Court of Appeals has required strict compliance with rule 
11.3 before sustaining a default judgment obtained after a party's attorney has withdrawn 
and, if not, "the judgment must be set aside as a matter of law, rather than a matter of 
discretion. This Court agrees that there must be strict compliance with rule ll(b)(3)." 
See Wright v. Wright, 950 P.2d 1257 (Idaho 1998). (citations omitted). Johnson fails to 
even cite Wright, let alone distinguish it in any way from this case. 
Rule 11.3 was not strictly complied with in this case for two separate reasons. 
A. Rule 11.3 was not strictly followed when the motion to withdraw and 
notice of hearing were not served on Nunez. 
The withdrawing attorney in this case failed to serve a copy of the motion to 
withdraw or the notice of hearing on Nunez. Johnson cites the case of McClure 
Engineering, Inc. v. Channel 5 KIDA, 155 P.3d 1189 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006) to support his 
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argument that the default judgment of dismissal entered against Nunez was not void even 
though Nunez' counsel failed to serve a copy of the motion to withdraw or the notice of 
hearing on Nunez. 
But McClure Engineering, Inc. does not help Johnson since the Idaho Court of 
Appeals found in that case that the withdrawing attorney strictly complied with rule 11.3. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals distinguished the case from Wright because the attorney in 
Wright admitted that he sent the motion and notice to the wrong address but the attorney 
in McClure Engineering, Inc. sent the motion to the correct address. "The evidence 
shows that [the withdrawing attorney] sent his motion to withdraw and the withdrawal 
order by certified mail to the correct business address .... The district court correctly 
found that ... there was no violation of rule ll(b)(3)." Id. at 1194. 
In this case, the withdrawing attorney failed to serve the motion to withdraw or the 
notice of hearing on Nunez and so, as Johnson's counsel admitted during oral argument, 
the "motion to withdraw was defective in that [withdrawing counsel] didn't appear 
to serve it on Ms. Nunez." See Tr. page 7, line 1 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the efforts to comply with rule 11.3 were even less than those found, 
as a matter of law, insufficient in Wright because the attorney in Wright made an attempt, 
albeit a poor one, to send the motion and notice to his client but in this case no attempt at 
all was made to send Nunez a copy of the motion to withdraw or notice of hearing. 
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B. Rule 11.3 was not strictly followed when the order to withdraw contained the 
wrong deadline. 
Johnson argues that the inclusion of the wrong deadline to enter an appearance is 
harmless error. Johnson fails to cite to or discuss Wright's holding that requires strict 
compliance with rule 11.3. 
Johnson's counsel acknowledged that "there is a technical defect in that order 
in that it says '20 days' instead of '21 days."' See Tr. page 7, lines 14-17 (emphasis 
added). 
Johnson argues that the inclusion of the wrong deadline does not affect Nunez' 
substantive rights but provides no reasoning to support a position that the reduction in 
time to comply with an order does not affect Nunez' substantive rights. Regardless, the 
assessment for the court is not whether the defect was harmless. Instead, this Court held 
in Wright that there must be strict compliance with rule 11.3. An order that contains the 
wrong deadline that shortens the time for compliance does not strictly comply with rule 
11.3. 
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C. Johnson inappropriately filed a motion to dismiss while the case was stayed. 
The order granting Nunez' counsel to withdraw stayed the case until Nunez' 
counsel served a copy of the order on Nunez. Nunez' counsel never served the order on 
Nunez. The order did not contain any language that the stay would be lifted if the clerk 
served the order. So whether the court clerk served a copy of the order on Nunez is not 
relevant to determine whether the case was stayed when Johnson filed his motion to 
dismiss. It is undisputed that at that time Johnson filed his motion to dismiss Nunez' 
counsel had not served the order on Nunez as required by the order and that the case was 
stayed. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has already held that there must be strict compliance with rule 11.3 and 
that trial courts must, as a matter of law, set aside default judgment when there is a failure 
to strictly comply with rule 11.3. Johnson's counsel acknowledged that rule 11.3 was not 
strictly complied with when Nunez' counsel failed to serve the motion to withdraw and 
notice of hearing on Nunez and when the court order contained the wrong deadline to 
comply. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Nunez' motion 
to set aside and remand for further proceedings. 
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DATED January 23, 2018. 
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